J. Value Inquiry 17:33–52 (1983).

UTILITY AND EQUALITY: SOME NEGLECTED PROBLEMS

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I

Utilitarianism frequently is attacked on the grounds that is can sanction inequitable distributions of harms and benefits. Since the end set by the theory is aggregative, critics argue that it could require that some few individuals be made to suffer a lot so that the rest of humanity might individually gain a little, the aggregative gain by the many more than compensating for the grievious losses of the few. Those with egalitarian moral leanings find such an outcome otiose and have sought a more equitable principle of distributive justice than they think utilitarian theory provides. For their part, utilitarians have devised various replies, and the debate has continued unabated. And likely will. But there are other notions and principles of equality in addition to, and more basic than, those that figure in the debate over equal distribution. This latter debate concerns the justice of distributing harms and benefits between various individuals, assuming that, prior to distributive concerns, the affected individuals have been treated equitably. It is this predistributive sense of equality that Bentham marks by his famous declaration that 'each is to count for one, no one for more than one,' an understanding of equality which, in Peter Singer's words, 'utilitarians, from Jeremy Bentham to J.J.C. Smart, take . . . as axiomatic . . . in deciding moral issues.'[1] In their rush to air what they regard as the unsavory moral implications of utilitarianism concerning distributive justice, utilitarianism's critics have failed to give equal time to the problem this Benthamite notion of equality poses for utilitarian theory. The present discussion attempts to partially remedy this oversight.

II

Singer should know whereof he speaks since he is himself a self-avowed utilitarian,[2] and the Benthamite notion of equality bulks very large in his thought. It will be instructive, therefore, to begin by asking what equality means in Singer's hands. It is not factual equality. When, for example, we say that all humans are equal, we do

not mean that everybody has the same abilities, hair color, or number of arms. If this were what we meant, then the declaration of equality would be patently false. Instead, the kind of equality Singer has in mind is expressed by 'the basic moral principle of equality,'[3] a principle that is 'not a description of an alleged actual equality among humans: it is a prescription of how we should treat humans'[4] and, Singer argues, many nonhuman animals besides.[5] What this principle prescribes is that 'the interests of every being affected by an action are to be taken into account and given the same weight as the like interests of any other being.'[6] For convenience's sake let us refer to the principle just quoted as the equality principle. That principle, then, according to Singer, is (a) prescriptive, not descriptive; (b) basic; (c) moral; (d) concerns the range of interests to be considered ('the interests of every being affected by an action are to be taken into account'); and (e) prescribes that equal interests be counted equally.

Two options are available to Singer, given his view that the equality principle is a basic moral principle. Either he may regard it as a basic moral principle in the logical sense of 'basic', meaning that it cannot be derived from any other moral principle,[7] or he may regard it as basic in a nonlogical sense, meaning that though it is derivable it is of especially crucial moral importance. Surprisingly, some of what Singer writes strongly suggest that he inclines toward the former option. Thus, for example, he writes the following:

> The only principle of equality I hold is the principle that the interests of every being affected by an action are to be taken into account and given the same weight as the like interests of any other being . . . (U)tilitarianism presupposes this principle.[8]

This last sentence commits Singer to the view that a logical relationship holds between the principles of equality and utility. When he says that utilitarianism *presupposes* the equality principle he implies that unless we assume the validity of the equality principle utilitarianism has no moral or logical footing. What the quoted passage implies, in short, is that rather than the moral principle of equality depending on that of utility, the reverse is true: The principle of utility depends on the more basic moral principle of equality.

No consistent utilitarian can believe this. If utility is, as it must be for the utilitarian, and as Singer says it is, 'the *sole* (moral) basis of morality,'[9] then all other moral principles must be derivable from it and it in turn cannot presuppose any other more or equally basic moral principle. For a utilitarian to argue otherwise is to render utilitarianism incoherent. Singer must, therefore, avoid the first option at all costs.

The second option promises to be more attractive.[10] If, as this option maintains, the equality principle, like all other moral principles save that of utility itself, is derivable from the principle of utility, then selecting this alternative at least permits one to advance what looks to be a coherent version of utilitarianism. But the attractiveness of this second option is illusory. The attempt to ground the equality

principle in that of utility involves a gross distortion of the notion of equality as it applies to interests. The equality or inequality of the interests of two individuals, A and B, depends on how important their respective interests are *to them*, A's interest being equal to B's if their interests have like importance to A and B, respectively, A's and B's interests being unequal if the case is otherwise.The equality or inequality of their interests cannot depend on how the interests of others will be affected if A's and B's interests are considered as equal or unequal. It this were so, then we would be free to regard the *same* interests of A and B as equal at one time and as unequal at another, because the interests of others happened to be affected differently by regarding A's and B's interests differently at these different times. This is to make a shambles of the notion of equality as it applies to interests. And yet this is precisely where we are led in our understanding of equal interests, if the obligation to respect the equality principle is derived from the principle of utility. For the *utility* of counting A's and B's interests as equal can vary from case to case, even if their interests themselves do not. Thus, if utility be our guide, we are permitted to count the same interests as equal in one case and as unequal in another. This is to distort the concept of equal interests beyond recognition.

The upshot of the foregoing does not bode well for a position like Singer's. The dilemma that must be faced is that of either setting forth a view of the relationship between the moral principles of utility and equality that renders utilitarianism inconsistent (the argument given against the first option) or setting forth an account of the relationship between these two principles which avoids the charge of inconsistency but only at the price of grossly distorting the concept of equal interests (the argument given against the second option). It should be emphasized that the choice between these two alternatives cannot be avoided by a utilitarian who, like Singer, maintains that the equality principle is a *moral* principle. For then that principle must either be conceived to be underived, in which case the charge of inconsistency will apply, or derived, in which case the charge of distortion will prevail. In either case, therefore, the equality principle can find no home within utilitarianism, if, like Singer, utilitarians view the equality principle as a moral principle.

III

There is an obvious way for utilitarians to try to avoid this outcome. This is to regard the equality principle as a *formal* moral principle rather than as a substantive one – as a principle, that is, that does not itself lay down a moral obligation concerning what we are to do but one which sets forth a condition that must be met by any substantive moral principle that does lay down such an obligation. On this view of the equality principle, in other words, this principle incorporates at least a partial test for determining when a principle is a moral as distinct from a nonmoral principle. Principles that pass this test to that extent qualify as moral principles; those that fail it lack that status. Thus, the principle of utility qualifies, since it enjoins us to consider the interests of everyone affected and to count equal interests equally.

Ethical egoism, on the other hand, since it neither bids us to canvass the interests of all affected parties nor to count equal interests equally, fails to have the status of a moral principle.

To regard the equality principle as a formal moral principle does avoid the dilemma fatal to those utilitarians who, like Singer, view that principle as a substantive moral principle. The trouble for this defense of utilitarianism is that it is false that the equality principle is a formal moral principle, in the sense explained. Recall that that principle (i) concerns the range of interests to be considered ('the interests of every being affected by an action are to be taken into account'), and (ii) prescribes that equal interests be counted equally. If the equality principle is said to be a formal moral principle, then no principle that fails to comply with (i) and (ii) could qualify as a moral principle. This is not true. An extreme deontologist, such as Kant arguably is, who thinks that considerations about the interests Singer and other utilitarians have in mind – namely, what it is that individuals happen to want or desire – are irrelevant to the determination of where our moral duty lies, may advance a defective vision of morality. But not even Kant's harshest critics will maintain that the categorical imperative does not have the *status* of a moral principle: Mistaken it may be, but at least it must be found to be mistaken *as a moral principle*. Since, then, principles which fail to comply with (i) and (ii) might nonetheless have the status of a moral principle, it is false that the equality principle is a formal moral principle, in the sense explained.

IV

But if the equality principle is not a formal moral principle; and if, for the reasons given in the earlier discussion of Singer's views, this principle cannot reasonably be viewed as a substantive moral principle within utilitarian theory; then what is a utilitarian to do? The Benthamite proviso, 'each to count for one, no one for more than one,' allegedly 'axiomatic' for utilitarianism, paradoxically seems not to be able to find a place within that theory.

Short of abandoning utilitarianism, there remains one final alternative. This is for the utilitarian to regard the equality principle as a conditional formal principle. To say it is conditional is to say that it becomes operative only if certain conditions are met. Singer provides a clue as to what these conditions might be when he observes that each of us has a 'very natural concern that (our) own interests are to be looked after.'[11] Suppose we acknowledge this natural propensity. Then we shall surely want others to take note of our interests and weigh them equitably – that is, not to discount the importance of our interests just because they are not their interests. If my interest in x is the same as yours, then I shall want you to give the same weight to my interest as you give to yours. If you do not, then you will have lapsed back into egoism, which is tantamount to saying that you are not taking the moral point of view. For to take that point of view requires that one be willing to universalize one's judgments of value. This requirement falls to me, however, not

just to others. Thus, if I place a certain value on my interest in x, I must recognize the like value of anyone's similar interest; and if I would have others take note of my interests, because they are important to me, then I must take note of theirs, recognizing that they are important to them. In this way, then, we arrive at the equality principle, only now viewed as a conditional formal principle. Let us refer to this way of viewing equality as 'conditional equality' and express this principle as follows: If I would have others consider my interests and count them equitably, and if I am to take the moral point of view, then I commit myself to considering the interests of all those affected and to counting equal interest equally.

Kantians and other extreme deontologists likely would look with disfavor even on this way of viewing the equality principle. If the interests we happen to have are irrelevant to the determination of where our moral duty lies, they are apt to say, then we ought not to mix considerations about interests with taking the moral point of view. But suppose we bypass this line of debate, important though it is, on the present occasion and assume that some individual (A) not only understands but actually accepts conditional equality; that is, assume that A *would* have others consider his interests and weigh them equitably, that A *would* take the moral point of view, and that, as a consequence of both these assumptions, A does agree that he, too, must canvass the interests of others and count equal interests equally. Granting all this, we may then go on to ask about how A may view the principle of utility.[12] Two options are again at hand. The first is that acceptance of conditional equality is *consistent* with utilitarianism. This is a weak option because on its face it provides no reason for selecting utilitarianism in preference to other substantive views of morality that also are consistent with acceptance of conditional equality – e.g., Ross' view that there are many rules of prima facie duty. Weak though this option is, even it is too strong for certain varieties of utilitarianism, as will be shown in section VI. The second, strong option is that acceptance of the conditional equality principle *logically commits one to* the principle of utility. This strong option can itself take two forms, SO_1 maintaining that acceptance of conditional equality commits one to accepting the principle of utility *to the exclusion* of any other substantive moral principle, and SO_2 maintaining that acceptance of conditional equality commits one to accepting utility as a minimal moral principle while leaving open the possibility that *there may be other* moral principles besides that of utility which one may also consistently accept. R.M. Hare possibly accepts SO_1. I say 'possibily' because it is not altogether clear to me what Hare's considered view is in this regard.[13] Singer, however, evidently accepts SO_2. He writes:[14]

> The utilitarian position is a minimal one, a first base which we reach by universalizing self-interested decision making. We cannot, if we are to think ethically, refuse to take this first step.

Here Singer allows that there *may* be other moral principles in addition to utility, while maintaining that we *must* accept utility if, starting with our individual interests, we take the moral point of view. For to take that point of view, starting

with our self-interest, commits us to the conditional equality principle. And this in turn commits us to utilitarianism. At least this appears to be both a natural and fair interpretation of the crucial argument for accepting utilitarianism in the following passage.

> Suppose I begin to think ethically, to the extent of recognizing that my own interests cannot count for more, simply because they are mine, than the interests of others. In place of my own interests, I now have to take account of the interests of all those affected by my decision. This requires me to weigh up these interests and adopt the course of action most likely to maximize the interests of those affected. Thus I must choose the course of action which has the best consequences, on balance, for all affected. This is a form of utilitarianism. It differs from classical utilitarianism in that 'best consequences' is understood as meaning what, on balance, furthers the interests of those affected, rather than merely what increases pleasure and pain.[15]

It is by means of the argument just quoted, then, that Singer evidently believes we are able to support SO_2 – the view, again, that acceptance of the principle of conditional equality commits one to accepting utility at least as a minimal, though not necessarily as the only, substantive moral principle. Since it cannot be true that acceptance of conditional equality commits one to accepting the principle of utility as the *only* substantive moral principle unless acceptance of conditional equality commits one to accepting the principle of utility as *a* moral principle, to show that SO_2 is not true will be tantamount to showing that SO_1 is not true either.

Now, before we can show why SO_2 is false, it is necessary to make some preliminary remarks about the need utilitarian's have for a theory of value and, more particularly, about the role of interests in setting forth such a theory. These remarks are offered in Section V. Though what is argued there will be used, in Sections VI and VII, to close the door to some versions of utilitarianism, they also leave a possible opening for another version, which is discussed in Sections VIII and IX. The material in Section V thus has both a critical and a potentially liberating function to play vis-à-vis utilitarian theory.

V

Utilitarians, of whatever stripe, are required to complement their theory of obligation with a theory of value, since without a theory of the latter kind the utilitarian injunction to bring about 'the best' consequences will be empty and thus will provide no moral direction. As is well known, the history of utilitarian theory is characterized by sharp disagreement over what has intrinsic value and disvalue, the classical utilitarians, Bentham and Mill, for example, holding that pleasure and pain are the only intrinsic good and evil, respectively, while Moore's so-called 'ideal utilitarianism' holds that there is a plurality of intrinsic goods and evils which are not reducible to pleasure and pain.[16] Our interest on the present occasion does not

lie in the attempt to decide who is right in this regard. Rather, the point to be made is the uncontroversial one, that given *any* version of utilitarianism we are entitled to require that its advocates supply us with some account of value.

The second point is this. If acceptance of conditional equality is supposed to commit one to acceptance of utility, and in view of the central importance of the notion of interests in the formulation of the conditional equality principle, one would expect that it must be this same notion that is central to the account of value that forms the logical background of this argument and informs the utilitarian injunction to bring about 'the best' consequences. This must be the case since, if the needed account of value turned out to be independent of the notion of interests, so that what counted as 'the best' consequences was quite independent of anyone's having any interest whatsoever, then it would be altogether mysterious, not to say downright unintelligible, how anyone could think that by accepting the conditional equality principle we commit ourselves to accepting the principle of utility. In order for this commitment to seem even plausible, therefore, one must assume that the content of 'the best' consequences is to be cashed in terms of the notion of interests that figures so prominently in the conditional equality principle. The reasonableness of this expectation is borne out by what Singer says, since 'the best' consequences, in his view, are not to be identified with maximizing pleasure and reducing pain, say, but are to be 'understood as meaning what, on balance, furthers the interests of those affected.'

But the notion of having an interest is ambiguous.[17] To say that some individual (A) has an interest in something (x) might mean either that (1) A wants, desires, prefers, lusts after, etc. x, or that (2) having x would promote A's welfare or would contribute to A's good or well-being. Suppose we call the former sense of having-an-interest the preference sense and the latter the welfare sense. The two certainly are distinct. An alcoholic may want a drink, and thus have an interest in a drink, in the preference sense, despite the fact that having a drink would not be in his interests, so that he has no interest in it, in the welfare sense, and a heart patient may have an interest in a salt-free, low-fat diet, in the welfare sense, despite the fact that he dislikes this diet and so has no interest in it, in the preference sense. Given the ambiguity of talk of 'having an interest'; and given that, as just illustrated, individuals can have an interest in something in one sense and not have an interest in the same thing in the other; the question arises, *Which* sense of 'having an interest' is at work in attempts to show that anyone who accepts the conditional equality principle, with its emphasis on interests, is committed to the principle of utility, when that principle is understood as directing us to bring about 'what, on balance, furthers the interests of those affected'? This question is of fundamental importance since which sense is involved will determine the account of value we are being asked to accept, either what we shall call a *preference theory*, according to which, roughly speaking, value is the object of any preference, of a *welfare theory*, according to which what has value is what contributes to an individual's good, welfare, or well-being.

The evidence at hand supports interpreting both Singer and Hare as exponents of

a preference theory. In Singer's case this finding is supported by the very name he gives to his version of utilitarianism – namely, 'preference utilitarianism'[18] – and by what he states about interests generally, as when, for example, he writes, without dissenting, that we may 'define "interests" broadly enough, so that we count anything that people desire as in their interests (unless it is incompatible with another desire or desires) . . .'[19] In the case of Hare, the evidence is less palpable, but it is especially noteworthy that when he gives his argument for utilitarianism, an argument which, he observes, 'emphasizes that equal interests are to be counted equally,' his argument *ultimately* appeals to what the individuals affected by an action's outcome would *wish*,[20] which strongly suggests that the argument relies on what the affected individuals have an interest in, in the preference, as distinct from the welfare, sense of 'have an interest.' Moreover, Singer, in commenting on his argument for utilitarianism, the one quoted in the previous section, observes that this 'argument for utilitarianism based on *interests or preferences* owes much to Hare's 'Ethical Theory and Utilitarianism', although it does not go as far as the argument in that article.'[21] In interpreting Hare as viewing interests as preferences, therefore, we reach the same interpretive finding as Singer, and though our agreement with Singer does not establish that we are right, it at least shows that interpreting Hare as we do is not idiosyncratic.

There are familiar objections that can be raised against the adequacy of a preference theory of value. Suppose we assume that a given individual (A) prefers something (x). At the very most what follows from this is that A places some positive value on x. What does not clearly follow is that x is valuable. If I prefer your untimely death, your public shame, or the ruination of your marriage or health, then, let us assume, I place a positive value on any or all of these outcomes. But it is difficult to see how, assuming just this much, it follows that any or all these outcomes are themselves valuable. To show *their* value, it is fair to say, will require considerably more than showing that I personally prefer them, or even that most people do. So there is, at the outset, a serious question to be raised about the adequacy of any preference theory of value. This question is mentioned but not explored here, not because it is unimportant, but because our present interest lies in another quarter. Our present concern lies in asking about *the possible logical relationship* between accepting the conditional equality principle, on the one hand, and, on the other, accepting the principle of utility, at least as a minimal moral principle. And this is a question that can be examined independently of our contesting the adequacy of a preference theory of value, considered in its own right. It is this question to which we shall now direct our attention, remarking, before turning to our examination, that when, in the next two sections, the notion of having an interest is used, it is the preference sense that is meant. This will allow economy of expression and should not be a cause of misunderstanding. The second sense of having an interest – the welfare sense – will be explored more fully in sections VIII and IX.

VI

There are alternative ways of viewing the possible relationship between value and preferences.[22] In its most ambitious form the preference theory holds that (a) given any x, x has value for a given individual (A) *if and only if* A prefers x. Less ambitious forms are (b) x has value for A *if* A prefers x (that is, being the object of A's desires, etc., is a sufficient condition of x's having value for A), and (c) x has value for A *only if* A prefers x (that is, being the object of A's desires, etc., is a necessary condition of x's having value for A). The implications of these views differ in important ways, (b) allowing, for example, whereas (a) and (c) do not, that some x may have value for A independently of A's preferring it. Because these views differ, each must be examined as a possible way of understanding value available to those who seek to show that acceptance of conditional equality commits one to the principle of utility as a minimal moral principle. We shall postpone temporarily an assessment of (b) and concentrate first on that feature common to both (a) and (c) – the feature, namely, that it is a necessary condition of any x's having value for A that A prefer x. For convenience's sake, let us refer to this as 'the preference-necessary view.'

The preference-necessary view is a demonstrably inadequate account of value for those who seek to convince us that we are commited to the principle of utility, as a minimal moral principle, if we accept the principle of conditional equality. The preference-necessary view holds that x has value for A only if A prefers x. Thus, *whether A will place value on those consequences* which, in Singer's words, 'maximize the interests of those affected' *will depend on whether A happens* to have an interest in (i.e., prefers) these consequences. And it is perfectly possible that, though A may have an interest in many things, A does not have an interest in this.

In response it will be objected that if A fails to have an interest in maximizing the interests of those affected, then A fails to fully accept the conditional equality principle: Since that principle requires, among other things, that A consider the interests of everyone affected *and* count equal interests equally, he must, if he is to fulfill these requirements, also have an interest in, and thus prefer, maximizing the interests of everyone involved. This objection is specious and has apparent plausibility only because it trades on an ambiguity in the notion of 'equal interests.' The conditional equality principle requires that equal interests be counted equally. It does not require that one have an equal interest in equal interests. The difference can be brought out by imagining that A and B both have an equal interest in a given x (e.g., suppose x is the only available kidney and that both A and B have an equal desire to have it). Then the conditional equality principle requires that A not discount the importance B attaches to getting x just because B is not A. If their interests (preferences) are equal, then A must recognize that, looked at from B's point of view, getting x would be just as good for B, other things being equal, as A's getting x would be, viewed from A's point of view. But it does not follow from this, and conditional equality does not itself require, that A must have an interest in B's getting x equal to A's interest in his (A's) getting x – that A himself must prefer B's

getting x as much as A prefers his (A's) getting x. From 'I know that you want x as much as I do,' in other words, 'I want *you* to get x as much as *I* want to get it' does not follow. Thus one can recognize the equality of other's interests to one's own without being committed to preferring that they further their interests as much as one prefers furthering one's own. And since one is not committed to this even when one counts equal interests equally and considers the interests of all who will be affected by an action's outcome, one who accepts the conditional equality principle certainly is not committed to *having an interest in* 'maximizing the interests of those affected.'

The situation, then, is this. If A's having an interest in x is a necessary condition of A's valuing it, then A can accept the conditional equality principle and yet not place, and not be committed to placing, any value on maximizing the interests of everyone affected by an action's outcome. A is not committed to this because A may *accept* the conditional equality principle and yet not have, and not be committed to having, *an interest in* maximizing the interests of everyone affected. So, the attempt to generate a commitment to utilitarianism, where this calls for maximizing the interests of everyone affected, out of acceptance of conditional equality, fails, if we assume that the account of value on which the argument depends is the preference-necessary view.

An alternative account of the relationship between value and interest is the preference-sufficient view: For any x, x has value for A if A prefers x. Since this view of value differs from the preference-necessary view, we need to ask whether this difference makes any difference to the question at hand – the question of whether acceptance of conditional equality commits one to acceptance of utility as a minimal moral principle. The answer is no. What the preference-sufficient view implies is that *if* A happens to have an interest in maximizing the interests of everyone affected by an action's outcome, then A will value that outcome. But since A might just as well not have an interest in that outcome and still accept the principle of conditional equality, it follows that the preference-sufficient view will not suffice as account of value that would necessitate the movement from acceptance of conditional equality to acceptance of the principle of utility, not even as a minimal principle.

Again it will be objected that if A fails to have an interest in maximizing the interests of everyone affected by an action's outcome, then it follows that A fails to satisfy the requirements of the principle of conditional equality. But this reply has no more force in the present case than it had in the previous discussion of the preference-necessary view. Recognizing the equality of other's interests to one's own does not commit one to preferring that their interests be furthered as much as one prefers that one's own are. A must, it is true, recognize that, judged from B's point of view, it would be just as good (just as desirable, let us assume) if B's interests were furthered as it would be good, judged from his (A's) point of view, if his (A's) were, assuming that they have equal interests and assuming that other things are equal. But, in an interesting turnabout of Mill's famous problem about inferring 'X is desirable' from 'X is desired,' it simply does not follow that A must himself desire that B's interests be furthered, least of all that A must desire this as

much as he desires that his own interests will be. Thus, since one is not committed to *preferring* that others further their interests just because one recognizes that they have interests some of which are equal to one's own, one who considers the interests of others and counts them equally is not committed to the utilitarian prescription of acting so as to maximize the interests of everyone involved, given the preference-sufficient view. One can *accept* the conditional equality principle and not be committed to valuing the maximization of everyone's interests as 'the best' consequences, *if* we assume that one's viewing these consequences as 'the best' is contingent upon one's happening to prefer them.

Since, therefore, neither the preference-necessary nor the preference-sufficient view commits one who accepts the conditional equality principle to having an interest in, or thus, on either view, to valuing the maximization of the interests of, those affected by an action's outcome, neither view of the relationship between value and interests will help validate the inference from (1) acceptance of the principle of conditional equality to (2) acceptance of the principle of utility. And the same is true when the preference-necessary and the preference-sufficient views are combined, though a detailed supporting argument will not be adumbrated here. It follows, therefore, assuming that the argument for utilitarianism based on acceptance of conditional equality assumes one of the views regarding the relationship between interest and value examined in the preceding, that this argument fails to establish that those who accept the principle of conditional equality must therefore accept the principle of utility, at least as a minimal principle. And since it fails to establish *this* much on behalf of utilitarianism, it also follows that this argument cannot establish *more* than this. The argument in question, in other words, fails to establish that those who accept conditional equality must therefore accept the principle of utility as the *only* substantive moral principle, if value is understood in terms of one or another of the versions of the preference theory examined in the preceding. When value is understood in these ways, both SO_1 and SO_2, as characterized earlier, are false.

VII

The following, then, has been argued to this point regarding the relationship between the principle of utility and the predistributive sense of equality marked by Bentham's declaration, 'each to count for one, no one for more than one.' In section II it was argued that no utilitarian can reasonably hold that the equality principle, when this is interpreted in terms of considering the interests of those affected and counting equal interests equally, is a *moral* principle, basic (which would make utilitarianism inconsistent) or derived (which would distort the concept of equality as it applies to interests). Singer in particular, therefore, must cease referring to equality as 'a basic ethical principle,' if he continues to subscribe to utilitarianism. Thus, on any possibly reasonable version of utilitarianism, the equality principle must be regarded as a formal principle, not in the sense that it sets forth a

necessary condition of any principle's having the status of a moral principle – this it does not do, because, e.g., the categorical imperative, as was argued in section III, has this status but does not bid us consider the interests of the individuals involved – but, at most, that it sets forth a conditional formal requirement, in a sense explained in section IV. But because of the arguments just advanced in Section V, there is no reason to believe that, viewed in this way, acceptance of the conditional equality principle 'leads to' utilitarianism, even as a 'minimal' moral principle, when the account of value that forms the backdrop is some version of the preference theory.

There remains, then, the weak option characterized in section IV – the view that, though acceptance of conditional equality does not lead to utilitarianism, even as a minimal principle, one is at least *consistent* if one accepts both the principles of utility and conditional equality. Even this weak option is too strong, however, if the connection between value and interests is understood in any of the ways available to preference theorists, as these ways were characterized in the preceding section. One thing utilitarians *are* committed to is that it sometimes is the case that either of two outcomes would be as good as the other. For example, if A_1 would bring about as much good for A as A_2 would bring about for B, then, *ceterus parabus*, utilitarians must maintain that A_1 would be just as good as A_2; *either* alternative, the utilitarian must say, would be equally good, equally desirable, no matter who is the beneficiary, A or B. That being so it is incumbent upon the utilitarian to rely on a theory of value that requires that, for cases like the one just described, anyone who would judge one alternative to have a certain value must also make (i.e., is rationally committed to making) the same judgment of value about the other. No version of the preference theory can ground this requirement. Given the preference-necessary view, y has value for A only if A has an interest in y. Let us assume that A has an interest in y and that B does too, B's interest being equal to A's .Utilitarianism requires a theory of value that commits A to making the same judgment of value, *ceteris parabus,* about B's getting y as he would make about his (A's) getting it. The preference-necessary view fails in this regard. For since A can recognize that his and B's interest in y are equal without having, or being committed to having, any interest in B's getting y, it follows, *given the preference-necessary view*, that A can place a value on his getting y that differs from the value he would place on B's getting it. Thus, since utilitarianism requires a theory of value that commits A to making the same value judgment whether he or B gets y; and since the preference-necessary view does not carry this commitment; utilitarianism cannot rely on the preference-necessary view. Indeed, the preference-necessary view not only does not commit A to making the same judgment of value; it positively justifies A in making different judgments, assuming that he himself does not have an interest in B's getting y. Thus, the preference-necessary view would authorize judgments of value that are inconsistent with those judgments utilitarians *must* make, given their theory. And since the preference-necessary view has implications that are inconsistent with the implications of utilitarianism, the preference-necessary view of value cannot consistently be held by utilitarians.

The same is true of the preference-sufficient view. On this view, x has value for A *if* A has an interest in it. If we suppose that A and B have an equal interest in y, it does not follow that A must say that it would be just as good if B got y as it would be if he (A) did, assuming the preference-sufficient view. Given this view, A needn't say this *if* it happens to be the case that A has no interest in B's getting y. For if A has no interest in B's getting y, then A is not *committed* to placing any value whatever on B's getting it, *assuming the preference-sufficient view*. Thus, the preference-sufficient view is unable to account for the *necessity*, within utilitarian theory, of A's being committed to judging that it would be just as good, just as desirable, if he got y *or* if B did. On the contrary, the preference-sufficient view can allow A to deny the value of B's getting y, if it so happens that A has no interest in B's getting it. The preference-sufficient view, therefore, like the preference-necessary view, presents us with an account of value that is *logically* at odds with implications of utilitarian theory. And since these views of value, considered either singly or together, have implications that are inconsistent with views that utilitarians are committed to – utilitarians *must* judge that A's or B's getting y would be equally valuable, other things being equal – these versions of the preference theory of value are themselves inconsistent with utilitarianism.

This much established, we can now return to the question of the consistency of the principles of conditional equality and utilitarianism. Earlier in this section it was stated that the two principles are not consistent if the connections between value and interests are understood in certain ways. What these ways are has now been explained. *If* the conditional equality principle is understood in a way that commits one to the preference-necessary view, *or* to the preference-sufficient view, *or* to the combination of these views, as previously characterized, then one assumes an account of value that is inconsistent with utilitarianism. Thus, if one interprets the notion of interests, as this is used in the conditional equality principle, in one or another of these ways, one interprets that principle in a way that proves to be inconsistent with the principle of utility. The fact that Singer does interpret interests in this way, and the fact that Hare at least seems to (see section V), is, if the argument of the present section is sound, absolutely fatal to their enterprise of requiring that those who accept conditional equality also accept the principle of utility. Not only does acceptance of the conditional equality principle, when it is understood in ways that commit one to some version of the preference theory, not 'lead to' the principle of utility; when conditional equality is understood in these ways it has implications that are, if the foregoing argument is sound, demonstrably inconsistent with the principle of utility, viewed *either* as the only *or* as a minimal moral principle.

This last point can be made in a related way. Utilitarianism requires that one take an impartial point of view regarding the desirability of the outcomes of alternative courses of action. One must regard that outcome as 'the best' which brings about the best consequences for everyone affected, whether or not this outcome furthers one's own interests maximally. What utilitarianism requires, therefore, is an account of value that illuminates why an individual, A, *must* recognize that the

consequences of a given action are 'the best' even in cases where A's own interests are not furthered maximally. No version of the preference theory discussed in the preceding is adequate in this regard. Since each version defines A's values in one way or another in terms of A's preferences, these accounts of value make A's judgment of value contingent upon what A happens to prefer. Thus, since A might not prefer consequences which are 'the best' for others but not for himself, and though A may not have this preference while at the same time he recognizes that others have preferences that are of equal importance to them as A's are to him, the versions of the preference theory canvassed in the foregoing cannot provide the theoretical underpinning for the impartial point of view utilitarianism requires. On the contrary, all versions of the preference theory offer accounts of value that *stand in the way* of grounding the necessity of taking the impartial point of view utilitarianism requires.[23]

Perhaps it will be replied that anyone who recognizes the equality of the interests of others to one's own but who does not have an interest in having these interests furthered equal to one's own interest in one's own case fails to display, to use words of Hare,[24] 'Christian humility and *agape* and the humanist counterparts.' The point is certainly arguable. But whatever its merits it is demonstrably irrelevant to the issue at hand. The issue at hand is whether, given A's acceptance of the conditional equality principle, he is committed to the utilitarian prescription of acting so as to maximize the interests of everyone involved. The argument advanced in the above is that he is not committed to this, given the versions of the preference theory examined. To reply that, though he is not committed to this, he nonetheless fails to display 'Chirstian humility and *agape* and the humanist counterparts' if he is unwilling to act to forward everyone's interests misses the logical target and also leaves undisclosed how the virtues of Christian humility and the like could themselves possibly be accounted for by some version of the preference theory. To *assume* that they could be accounted for in this way would be to beg the question and thus could not be used to prop up any version of the preference theory on behalf of utilitarians.

VIII

It is important to emphasize what does and does not follow from the argument advanced in sections VI and VII against SO_2 and, by implication, SO_1. What follows, if that argument is sound, is that neither SO_1 nor SO_2 can *possibly* be true if utilitarians accept some version of the preference theory of value. What does *not* follow from this, however, is that it *must* be inconsistent to accept both the principles of conditional equality and utility. This does not follow because, as noted in section V, the notion of having an interest is importantly ambiguous, having both a preference sense and a welfare sense. Now, given that the welfare sense of having an interest is not synonymous with the preference sense, it does not follow that the principles of conditional equality and utility are inconsistent when the notion of having an

interest is understood in the welfare sense, even if it is true, as has been argued in section VII, that these two principles are inconsistent if the notion of having an interest is understood in the preference sense. Indeed, not only does this not follow; for reasons about to be explained, the two principles arguably are *not* inconsistent, when the welfare interpretation of having an interest is applied.

The explanation of this possibly is as follows. When interests are understood in the welfare sense, what an individual has an interest in is not contingent upon what that or another individual happens to prefer (e.g., want, desire). For example, something (x) could be in A's interests and A might not want to have it, and the same thing could be in B's interests and A might not want B to have it either. Now imagine that A judges that x is in his interests in the welfare sense. Then A is committed to the view that x will contribute to his welfare independently of his happening to want x. That being so, A cannot consistently go on to deny that B's getting x would be equally good, assuming that he and B have equal interests, on the grounds that he (A) happens not to have an interest in (e.g., not to want) B to get x. This liberty would be available to A *if* interests were understood in the preference sense, but it is denied him when the welfare sense is understood. If A is to count equal interests equally, as conditional equality requires, then A cannot count his own interests as welfare interests and deny that status to the like interests of others. Interests equal to *his* welfare interests are equal *welfare* interests, no matter whose they are and independently of whether he personally happens to have an interest in seeing that others have their welfare interests furthered. Thus, if A judges that x is in his interest in the welfare sense, and if he concedes that B's interest in x is equal to his own, then A must acknowledge that B's getting x would benefit B as much as his (A's) getting x would benefit A. And since the value of A's getting x is independent of his wanting x and depends instead on how much having x will contribute to his welfare, the value of B's having x must turn on these same considerations. Given the welfare sense of interests, then, it is arguable that, A not only can, A *must* acknowledge that it would be just as good, just as desirable, if B got x as if he (A) did, even if he does not prefer both outcomes equally. Since this is the view of this matter utilitarians must accept and seek to illuminate by means of a theory of value, it is possible that, when interests are viewed in the welfare sense, and value is understood in terms of what contributes to an individual's welfare, utilitarians here have a theory of value whose implications are consistent with the implications of utilitarianism itself. This question cannot be pursued further on the present occasion, except to note again that neither Singer nor Hare, for example, understand the relationship between interests and value in the way utilitarianism would seem to require. Judged on the basis of the evidence at hand (see section V), they understand the notion of having an interest and the allied notion of having value in terms of individuals having preferences, when they should understand this family of ideas in terms of individuals having a welfare.

IX

Suppose the point most recently argued is true: One is *consistent* if one accepts both the principles of conditional equality and utility, if the notion of interests is understood in the welfare sense. Our final question, then, is whether one who accepts the conditional equality principle *must* accept the principle of utility, either as the sole or as a minimal moral principle, when interests are understood in the required way. Because the welfare sense of having an interest is distinct from the preference sense, one cannot dispute an affirmative answer to this question in the way an affirmative answer was disputed, in section VI, when the preference sense was involved. Since what is in A's interests, in the welfare sense, is not contingent on what A happens to prefer, A cannot avoid viewing those consequences which optimize everyone's welfare interests as 'the best' by insisting that he happens not to prefer this outcome. Thus, if those consequences utilitarianism views as 'the best' *are* those which optimize the welfare interests *of* everyone affected, rather than their preferences; if, that is, the form of utilitarianism we are to consider is what might be called welfare utilitarianism, not preference utilitarianism; then is it not the case that A *is* committed to the principle of utility *if* A accepts the principle of conditional equality? That is the question at hand.

A negative answer is once again the correct answer. To make this clearer, suppose that A accepts the conditional equality principle: A is committed to considering the interests of others, as he would have them consider his, and he is committed to counting equal interests equally, as he would have others do. Now, that really is *all* that acceptance of conditional equality comes to. As I have argued elsewhere,[25] this principle provides us with no direction regarding what we are morally obligated to do *after* interests have been canvassed and weighed equitably; all that it requires is that we do the canvassing and weighing. The principle of utility, on the other hand, does provide post-canvassing and post-weighing direction. It lays it down, to repeat Singer's characterization, that we 'must choose the course of action with the best consequences, on balance, for all affected.' But if the conditional equality principle does *not* provide us with the kind of direction provided by the principle of utility, how could it be that one who accepts the former principle *must* accept the latter? It is difficult to see how accepting a principle which is void of the kind of direction provided by the principle of utility could commit one to that latter principle.

This difficulty can be highlighted by reminding ourselves of the fundatmentally different status the two principles in question are supposed to have. The principle of conditional equality is a *formal* principle, one which specifies what one is committed to, given that one would have others consider one's own interests and weigh them equitably. The principle of utility, on the other hand, is a *substantive* moral principle, specifying those actions one has an obligation to perform. It is fundamentally unclear how it could be true that, by accepting a formal principle, one is thereby committed to a moral one. It is not unclear how, by accepting one moral principle, one might also be committed to another moral principle. But, for reasons

offered in the opening section of this essay, there are overwhelming reasons against a utilitarian's regarding the principle of equality as a moral principle, either as basic (underived), which would render utilitarianism inconsistent, or as nonbasic (derived), which would distort the notion of equal interests.

This last point bears on a final attempt the utilitarian might make to explain how accepting conditional equality commits one to the principle of utility, assuming, as we have throughout the present section, that the notion of having an interest is understood in the welfare sense. For suppose the utilitarian argues as follows: 'To accept the conditional principle of equality is not merely to commit oneself to considering the interests of others, as one would have them consider one's own; nor does it merely commit one to counting equal interests equally, whomever's interests they may be. To accept this principle *also* includes one's accepting the injunction *to act so as to further the interests of others*, as one would have others act so as to further one's own. But,' the utilitarian goes on, 'since one accepts this injuction as part of conditional equality, it follows that one must also agree to act as the principle of utility directs us. For how else can we act so as to forward the interests of all concerned save by acting as the utilitarian principle directs us? In this way, then, it is possible to show that anyone who accepts the conditional equality principle is and must be committed to the principle of utility, at least as a minimal moral principle, even if not the only one.'

Unfortunately for utilitarianism, this argument, however plausible it may appear, will not stand a moment's critical reflection. One cannot have it both ways. One cannot hold *both* that the conditional equality principle is a formal principle *and* that that principle directs us to act so as to further the interests of all concerned, since to interpret that principle in this latter way is to alter its status. It is to interpret it as a *substantive* moral principle. Moreover, for reasons only recently adduced for a second time, no utilitarian can reasonably hold that the equality principle *is* a substantive moral principle. Thus, on any reasonable version of utilitarianism, the equality principle must be viewed as a formal principle and, more particularly, for reasons given in section IV, as a conditional formal principle. The argument just given on behalf of the attempt to show that one commits oneself to utility if one accepts conditional equality is therefore doubly wrong – wrong, first, because no formal moral principle can be a substantive one, and wrong, secondly, because no utilitarian can consistently regard the equality principle as a moral principle from which the principle of utility can be derived. Despite illusions to the contrary, therefore, this last defense of utilitarianism proves to be deficient, and the conclusion we should reach is thus that, even when the notions of having an interest and value are understood in ways that at least make them consistent with utilitarian theory, it is not true that one who accepts the conditional equality principle is committed to the principle of uiltity, either as the sole or as a minimal moral principle.

It has not been the burden of the present essay to argue that utilitarianism is a false or otherwise unacceptable moral theory, though, for reasons I have offered elsewhere,[26] I believe it is. My interest thoughout has been to focus on a different and a surprisingly neglected range of problems that utilitarian theory must deal with: those problems associated with the predistributive, Benthamite notion of equality, 'each to count for one, no one for more than one.' I have sought to determine how this notion of equality, especially when it is interpreted in terms of the equality of interests, can find a home within utilitarian thought. If I am correct, this home can be provided *only if* the Benthamite principle of equality is regarded by utilitarians as a conditional formal principle, *and only if* the central notions of having an interest and value are understood in terms of what contributes to an individual's welfare, as distinct from what individuals prefer. Interpreted in these terms, the Benthamite principle of equality is at least consistent with utilitarianism. But that is all it is. The attempt to show that it is more – in particular, the attempt to show that acceptance of conditional equality commits one to the principle of utility, at least as a minimal moral principle – fails, just as Mill's attempted 'proof' of utility does. The failure laid bare in the present essay does not show that utilitarianism is false or otherwise unacceptable. What it does show is that, contrary to the arguments of Singer and Hare, and short of making Sidgwick's last-ditch appeal to 'inituition' as the vehicle by which we recognize the principle of utility's claim on our rational assent, we remain as far as we ever have been from having any compelling reason for accepting that principle as our moral guide.[27]

NOTES

1. Peter Singer, *Practical Ethics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 10–11.
2. See, for example, his 'The Fable of the Fox and the Unliberated Animal,' *Ethics* (January 1978):122.
3. 'All Animals Are Equal, '*Philosophical Exchange* (Summer 1974), reprinted in *Animal Rights and Human Obligations*, ed. Tom Regan and Peter Singer (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1976), p. 148. Page references are to the latter appearance of this essay. In his most recently published work, Singer continues to characterize equality as a moral or ethical principle. See his *Practical Ethics*, p. 18, where he writes that '(e)quality is a basic ethical principle, not an assertion of fact.'
4. Singer, 'All Animals Are Equal,' p.152.
5. See the previously cited works as well as *Animal Liberation* (New York: New York Review Book), 1975.
6. Singer, 'All Animals Are Equal, p. 152.
7. I assume that the problem of the *logical* relationship between the principles of utility and equality can and will arise for 'cognitivist' and 'noncognitivist' utilitarians alike, and thus that this problem could not be avoided by a Singer-type utilitarian who advocates a noncognitivist meta-ethic. In assuming that noncognitivist utilitarians can and will accept that logical relations hold between different moral prescriptions, I assume what noncognitivist utilitarians themselves profess. On this point, see R.M. Hare, *The Language of Morals*

(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952), esp. chs. 2 and 3; and J.J.C. Smart's contribution to *Utilitarianism: For and Against* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), esp. pp 7–9.

8. 'Utilitarianism and Vegetarianism,' *Philosophy and Public Affairs* (Summer 1980):328–29. For my criticisms of Singer's attempt to ground the moral obligatoriness of vegetarianism on utility, see my essay, 'Utilitarianism, Vegetarianism, and Animal Rights' in this same issue of *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, and my 'Animal Rights, Human Wrongs,' *Environmental Ethics* (Summer 1980):99–120.
9. Singer, 'Utilitarianism and Vegetarianism,' p. 329.
10. Though a possible option, I know of no utilitarian who has chosen it. Certainly Singer, much to his credit, does not. To do so would, among other things, undermine his case for animal liberation, since the utility of counting the interest animals have in avoiding pain as equal to the interest humans have in avoiding it might differ quite markedly.
11. Singer, *Practical Ethics*, p. 12.
12. In discussions of an earlier draft of the present essay, W.R. Carter made the point that the principle of conditional equality *itself* does not 'lead to' any substantive moral principle because it cannot do so. Carter's point is that since the conditional equality principle is expressed hypothetically ('If so and so, then such and such'); since there is no nontautological, nonhypothetical proposition that can follow necessarily from any hypothetical propostion; and since whatever else we may want to say of the principle of utiliity, all at least are agreed that it is not tautological *and* nonhypothetical; it follows that one cannot derive the principle of utility from the mere statement of the principle of conditional equality. What one must assume, and what is assumed in the argument that unfolds in the following pages, especially the argument of sections VI–IX, is that some individual (A) does accept the conditional equality principle; that is, A would have others consider his interests and to count them equitably, etc. The logical form of the argument to be examined in subsequent sections thus is not $([p \,\&\, q] \rightarrow r) \rightarrow s$, where p symbolizes 'A would have others consider his interests and count them equitably,' q symbolizes 'A takes the moral point of view,' r symbolizes 'A commits himself to considering the interests of all those affected and to counting equal interests equally,' and s symbolizes 'A commits himself to the principle of utility.' This cannot be the logical form of the argument since $([p \,\&\, q] \rightarrow r) \rightarrow s$ is not an *argument*. Rather, the form of the argument must be assumed to be as follows:

$$([p \,\&\, q] \rightarrow r) \rightarrow s$$
$$([p \,\&\, q] \rightarrow r)$$
$$\therefore \quad s$$

13. On one occasion Hare observes that utilitarianism is 'consistent' with his views on the meanings of the moral use of terms like 'right' and 'ought', thus suggesting that he would accept what I have termed 'the weak option.' See his 'Principles,' *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* (1972–1973), p. 15. On another occasion he argues that what I have termed the principle of conditional equality 'leads to' or 'yields' utilitarianism, thereby suggesting that he would accept 'the strong option.' See his 'Ethical Theory and Utilitarianism,' in H.D. Lewis, ed., *Contemporary British Philosophy* (London, 1976), pp. 116–117. I believe, though I shall not argue the point here, that Hare's arguments are open to all the same (and more) objections raised in the present essay against Singer's attempt to generate utilitarianism out of the conditional equality principle. I discuss this and related matters in an unpublished essay, 'Hare on Justice, Utility and the Appeal to Intuition.' It is also worth noting that Singer, for one, though acknowledging a debt to Hare for the use of the idea of getting utilitarianism from conditional equality, makes it clear that he does not think the argument shows as much as he thinks Hare supposes. 'The tentative argument for a utilitarianism based on interests or preferences owes most to

Hare's 'Ethical Theory and Utilitarianism', although it does not go as far as the argument in that article' (Singer, *Practical Ethics*, p. 222). Singer, then, evidently interprets Hare as selecting what I have labeled 'SO_1' – i.e., 'Strong Option$_1$.' I believe this is the most reasonable interpretation of Hare.

14. Singer, *Practical Ethics*, p. 13.
15. Ibid., pp. 12–13.
16. This does not mean that utilitarianism has clear sailing if only the preference theory of value is avoided. Serious problems remain even for a Moorean position regarding intrinsic value. On this, see my 'Moore's Accounts of 'Right', *Dialogue* (October 1972), and 'A Refutation of Utilitarianism' *Canadian Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming)*.
17. I note and explore this distinction in my 'McCloskey on Why Animals Cannot Have Right,' *Philosophical Quarterly* (October 1977).
18. Singer, *Practical Ethics*, p. 12.
19. Ibid.
20. R.M. Hare, 'Ethical Theory and Utilitarianism,' p. 117. It is worth noting that at one point Hare suggests an argument for utilitarianism that makes use of the notions of harm and benefit, thereby suggesting an argument that involves understanding interests and values in the welfare sense. It is highly significant, however, that Hare decides '*not* . . . to put my theory in terms of benefits and the reduction of harms, because this leads to difficulties that I wish to avoid' (ibid., emphasis added). If this means that Hare prefers to rest his argument or acceptance of some version of the preference theory of value, as the available evidence suggests he does, then, if the argument of section VII is sound, Hare has avoided some (unspecified) difficulties only to embrace the quite specific difficulty of relying on an account of value which is inconsistent with the very principle (utility) he seeks to support.
21. Singer, *Practical Ethics*, p. 222, emphasis added.
22. The distinctions drawn and addressed in what follows apply both to 'crude' and more refined types of preference theories of value. A crude form would be that x has value for A if A (just happens) to desire x. A more refined form would be that x has value for A if, on balance and after reflection on all the relevant facts, A then happens to desire x. Singer sometimes writes as if he is willing to endorse a crude form of preference theory (cf. *Practical Ethics*, p. 12) and, at other times, he writes as if only a more refined form is acceptable (cf. ibid., p. 80). The criticisms launched against SO_2 and, by implication, SO_1, in sections VI and VII, apply with equal force to both the crude and the more refined understandings of the connection between value and preferences.
23. Thus, the common argument that preference utilitarianism has serious problems of measuring or weighing the preferences of the individuals whose interests are affected by an action's outcome, though certainly a not unimportant ground for objecting to preference utilitarianism, actually concedes more to this variety of utilitarianism than should be conceded to it. That objection assumes that a preference theory of value is hospitable to utilitarianism, the problem being that it is difficult to work out a credible, reliable method of weighing and ranking preferences. The more fundamental difficulty, however, and the one argued for in the above, is that a preference theory of value actually is inconsistent with the principle of utility. For a perspicuous discussion of the 'measuring' problems preference utilitarians face, see Dan W. Brock, 'Utilitarianism,' in Tom Regan and Donald Van De Veer, eds., *Individual Rights and Public Policy* (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield), *1982*.
24. R.M. Hare, 'Ethical Theory and Utilitarianism,' p. 20, fn. 11. I do not mean to imply that Hare would object in this way at this point, only that someone might.
25. See my 'Utilitarianism, Vegetarianism, and Animal Rights', pp. 312 ff.
26. See, in particular, 'Utilitarianism, Vegetarianism, and Animal Rights' and 'A Refutation of Utilitarianism.'
27. Work on this essay was assisted by a grant from the National Endowment for the Humanities. It is a pleasure to acknowledge this support. I also want to thank Dale Jamieson, Barbara Levenbook and especially W.R. Carter for helpful criticisms of earlier drafts of this paper.